Abstract
Introduction
Civil conflicts remain a major economic development challenge. They lead to deaths and injuries, physical and economic insecurity, the loss and misallocation of assets, and potentially a different trajectory of long-run development. Internationally, they can cause trade disruptions, refugee flows, the rise of criminal and terrorist networks and impetus for war in neighboring countries (Cerra and Saxena 2008 , Blattman and Miguel 2010 , World Bank 2011 .
Unfortunately, while the empirical literature has tested a large number of conflict determinants (Sambanis 2001 , Fearon and Laitin 2003 , Collier and Hoeffler 2004 , most are not robust across samples and estimation methods (Hegre and Sambanis 2006) . The recent survey by Blattman and Miguel (2010) , concludes that the most robust determinants may be the level and growth rate of income per capita along with geographic factors like mountainous terrain.
Even so, Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010) find that the effect of income levels is sensitive to controlling for country fixed effects and historical factors, and Bazzi and Blattman (2014, BB hereafter) find no evidence linking commodity export price growth to civil war onset for 118 developing countries from . The no-effect result in BB is robust to using six different measures of civil war onset; controlling for a measure of commodity price shocks to household food and fuel consumption; and studying subsamples of autocracies, intermediate democracies, and countries with high ethnic polarization. The authors additionally show that the earlier Brückner and Ciccone (2010) result that export price declines cause civil war in subSaharan Africa fails to be robust to several minor specification changes. They, therefore, conclude that commodity price shocks are unlikely to be an important determinant of civil war onset.
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In this paper, we use a new dataset containing commodity export and import price shocks for 160 countries from to show that commodity terms of trade declines have a large and robust effect on civil war onset in countries with intermediate levels of ethnic diversity.
Since the size of the largest ethnic group explains 96% of the variation in the ethnic diversity measure, we also conjecture that a key problem may be ethnic dominance: countries where the ethnic plurality is large, but not so large that it cannot be challenged, may be most vulnerable to commodity price declines. This being said, the size of the largest group is also a strong predictor of the ethnic polarization measure defined in Montalvo and Reynal Reynal-Querol (2005) and based on Esteban and Ray (1994) . Although the ethnic dominance concept seeks to capture the presence of a single large group, and polarization seeks to capture the presence of two or more large groups, we find that there is too little variation in the ethnicity data to clearly distinguish their effects. On this basis, we conclude that efforts to delink terms of trade declines from civil war onset may benefit from focusing on countries with intermediate ethnic diversity, ethnic dominance or high ethnic polarization.
After we establish the main result, we try to explain the departure from BB's conclusion that commodity price declines have no clear effect on civil war onset. The evidence suggests that there are two minor reasons along with a major reason for the different results. The first minor reason is that BB use a different econometric specification: they test the effects of commodity price shocks during the current and two preceding years, while we focus on price shocks during the three preceding years. The second minor reason is that they test for differential effects of price shocks in ethnically polarized countries, but not in countries with intermediate ethnic diversity or ethnic dominance. The major reason, however, appears to be that we study the effects of terms of trade shocks -shocks to the ratio of export to import prices -instead of just 4 shocks to export prices. In contrast to BB, who choose to ignore import price shocks based on the argument that developing country households do not spend much on imports, our starting point is that the open economy macroeconomics literature tends to predict that export and import price shocks will have the same general equilibrium effect (Matsuyama 1988 , Easterly et al. 1993 , Turnovsky 1993 , Mendoza 1995 , Rodrik 1998 , 1999 , Agenor and Montiel 1999 . To see this clearly, consider a textbook economy that exports 100 units at $1 each and imports 20 units at $5 each. In this case, a ten percent decrease in the export price and a ten percent increase in the import price will both decrease the trade balance and aggregate demand by $10 on impact.
Apart from the civil war literature, the paper relates to the broader literature linking ethnicity to economic and political outcomes (Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina et al. 2003) .
While most of these studies test for a monotonic effect of ethnic diversity, we follow Temple (1998), Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) , and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) in studying the effect of intermediate ethnic diversity and particular group size distributions. However, instead of testing for a direct effect of ethnicity on social outcomes, we ask how ethnic dominance mediates the effect of terms of trade shocks. The fact that terms of trade growth is time-varying allows us to estimate a fixed effects panel and, therefore, control for unobserved country heterogeneity in civil war risk. In contrast, papers linking ethnicity directly to conflict are unable to include fixed effects as the standard ethnicity datasets in the literature are not timevarying. Miguel et al. (2004, Table 5 ) test whether ethnic diversity exacerbates the conflict effect of rainfall-induced growth shocks in sub-Saharan Africa, but find no evidence that this is the case. On the other hand, Rodrik (1999) finds that external shocks (the standard deviation of terms of trade growth times the international trade-to-GDP ratio) hitting developing countries in the 1970s were associated with larger future growth declines in countries with high ethnic 5 diversity, inequality, autocracy, or weak institutions. Unlike these papers, we document a nonlinear effect of ethnic diversity. Brückner and Gradstein (forthcoming) find that the political risk effect of oil price induced income declines decreases with ethnic polarization, but the correlation between their political risk effect measures and our civil war measures is almost zero.
We believe that our findings may help to synthesize two distinct views of civil war: the long-standing literature in political science, which stresses the importance of ethnic differences (Gellner 1983 , Horowitz 1985 , Smith 1986 , Posen 1993 , Gurr and Harff 1994 , McGarry and O'Leary 2013 The simplest interpretation may be Rodrik's (1999) argument that countries with a high level of latent social tensions (in our case, an ethnic dominance problem) are more likely to degenerate into redistributive conflict during economic downturns. Apart from increasing political tensions due to scarcity, recessions can, potentially, decrease the opportunity cost of fighting (Besley and In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 describes our data and empirical methodology.
Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 explains why our results differ from BB's. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 6
Data and Methodology
In this section, we introduce the data and methodology used to test the effect of commodity price shocks on the probability of civil war onset.
1 Table 1 Ethnicity. The main ethnicity dataset is Fearon (2003) who, after discussing the conceptual and practical difficulties of distinguishing ethnic groups, defines a prototypical ethnic group according to seven criteria. The two most important, and the only crucial ones, are common ancestry and a sense of community and self-consciousness as a group (Fearon 2003, p. 201) : "Members are conscious of group membership and view it as normatively and psychologically important to them." The other five criteria include sharing distinguishing cultural features, such as language, religion and customs, having or at least "remembering" a homeland, and having a shared, collectively represented and at least partly fact-based history as a group. The literature on ethnicity and nationalism (Gellner 1983 , Horowitz 1985 , Smith 1986 suggests that Fearon's criteria are widely accepted. The dataset codes 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries based on the CIA World Factbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, Library of Congress Country Studies, and country-specific sources.
Compared to Fearon (2003) Fearon's (2003) dataset. The population's racial composition seems particularly unlikely to change over the sample years. Fourth, our reading of the large qualitative literature on ethnicity and conflict suggests that, while ethnicity truly seems to matter for political behavior, efforts by politicians to manipulate ethnic boundaries are constrained by preexisting social categories (Horowitz 1985 , Smith 1986 ) and the efforts of competing politicians to make these categories Commodity Price Shocks. We study the civil war effects of changes in the commodity terms of trade (CTOT) index developed by Ricci et al. (2008) and Spatafora and Tytell (2009), M are averaged over the sample year ensures that the CTOT index is invariant to changes in export and import volumes in response to civil war and isolates the effect of commodity price fluctuations. We explain the data sources and detail the construction procedure in the appendix. If we compute the log difference,
, we get BB's measure of commodity export price growth minus a measure of import price growth.
7 However, following BB and Brückner and Ciccone (2010), we note that terms of trade shocks may be serially correlated and affect the economy and civil conflict with a lag. While both papers resolve this issue by including the current as well as one and two year lagged export price growth rates in their civil war regressions, we prefer to summarize the average annual terms of trade growth rate over a three-year period in the growth rate of the three-year moving average terms of trade index, The appendix shows that the growth rate of the three-year moving average is approximately equal to the average annual growth rate over the same three-year period. The only limitation of the moving average approach is that, in the regression specifications, we have to assume that the civil war effect of the annual shocks is the same. We cannot reject this assumption in the data 12 and the results with annual shocks look similar. The main reason we prefer to use the moving average approach is that we wish to interact the terms of trade shock with different ethnicity measures and it is easier to interpret two than six terms of trade related regression estimates. Indicators and a democracy index from the Polity IV Project. 8 The democracy index is a weighted average of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.
Control
Estimation. The estimation procedure is to regress a dummy for civil war onset on the lagged terms of trade shock and its interaction with different measures of ethnic composition.
All the regressions use country and year fixed effects, country-specific time trends, and robust standard errors clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. Thus, we estimate
where jt d is a dummy for civil war onset in country j in year t ,
is the lagged growth rate of the three-year moving average CTOT index, and j E is a dummy measuring the country's ethnic composition. We use the lagged rather than contemporary terms of trade shock
because, as we demonstrate below, it appears to be a somewhat better civil war predictor. (1) is the same specification BB use except that (1) we include the lagged growth rate of the moving average CTOT index, while BB include the current, one and two year lagged growth rates of their export price index. (2) We include the interaction term
, which allows the effect of the terms of trade shock to vary with the country's ethnic composition. Although BB similarly test the idea that ethnically polarized countries may be more vulnerable to economic shocks, they test it by splitting the sample into countries with below-and above median polarization rather than by including an interaction term.
In Table 2 , we display a series of preliminary results without ethnicity interactions. The goal is to highlight the advantages of using commodity terms of trade shocks rather than the commodity export price shocks that BB and others have studied. In column (1), we follow the exact BB civil war specification by including the annual growth rates of just our export price index in the current and two previous years. In column (2), we switch to using the export price growth rates from the three preceding years. In columns (3) and (4), we add the corresponding growth rates of the import price index in each of the first two regressions. The addition of the import price shocks greatly improves the p-values on the sum of the shocks compared to the first two specifications. The fact that the version with the lagged shocks in column (4) gives the lowest p-value further suggests that using the lagged price shocks predicts civil war more precisely. In columns (5) and (6), we show that replacing the three annual export and import price growth rates with their respective moving-average versions gives similar results for both 9 In the appendix we further estimate the effect of GDP per capita growth on civil war onset when the former is instrumented with terms of trade growth. Since the instruments are somewhat weak and we cannot be sure that the exclusion restriction is satisfied, however, the results should be interpreted cautiously. lag structures. Finally, column (7) simply includes the lagged growth rate of the moving average terms of trade. Although the terms of trade shock remains insignificant, the p-value now drops to 0.16.
Main Results
In order to support our claim that terms of trade declines cause civil war in countries with intermediate ethnic diversity or ethnic dominance, we have to be able to reject the null
The second-to-last row in Tables 3-5 reports the pvalue on this hypothesis test for each specification. In the last row of each table, we report the very similar p-values from including the three annual terms of trade growth rates plus their ethnicity interactions instead of the moving average growth rate and interaction terms. Figure 2 shows that regressing polarization on the ethnic plurality and its square yields a similarly high R 2 of 0.92.
Overall, Figure 1 suggests that it may be difficult to distinguish the effects of having an intermediate ethnic diversity level, an intermediately large ethnic plurality or high ethnic polarization.
To explore the issue further, we regressed civil war onsets on the terms of trade shock and its interaction with nine of the ten deciles of the plurality measure (with the first decile interaction omitted). We include this table in the appendix. 11 The results suggest that the adverse effects of terms of trade declines are concentrated in the fourth to seventh deciles or the plurality size range from 50 to 82 percent of the population. In column (2) of Table 2 
2010
) and net official foreign development assistance per capita (Nunn and Qian 2012) . In order to limit endogeneity problems, we include the controls one at a time and lag them five years.
Again, the qualitative results remain similar.
12
12 Controlling for democracy (Mukherjee 2006 ) also does not change the qualitative results. We also tried to control for potential endogeneity of commodity prices by removing the countries whose global export share of at least one commodity category exceeded 10%. This adjustment (which removed the US, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Australia, and Saudi Arabia) left the results unchanged.
Restricted sample estimates
In this subsection, we briefly restrict attention to the countries that (i) have an intermediate ethnic diversity level or ethnic dominance and (ii) experienced at least one civil war onset during the sample years. 13 The two restrictions jointly decrease the sample from an average of 148 countries with 4,600 observations in Tables 3-4 to an average of 19 countries with 570 observations in Table 6 . The estimating equation in the restricted sample is
The two-way sample restriction serves two purposes. First, it allows us to estimate the effect of terms of trade shocks in the onset-prone rather than all the intermediately diverse countries.
Second, it allows us to estimate a conditional logit model as a further robustness check. 14 The 13 Depending on the civil war measure, the relevant countries and onset years are Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), Burundi (1998 Burundi ( , 2000 , Colombia (1994 Colombia ( , 2001 Colombia ( , 2004 , Georgia (1993), Iran (1979) , Iraq (1974 , 1988 , 2004 ), Israel (1982 , Morocco (1979 ), Nepal (2002 , Nicaragua (1978 Nicaragua ( , 1983 , Pakistan (1974 Pakistan ( , 2008 , Peru (1983 , 1988 ), Russia (1995 , 1999 , 2004 , Serbia (1991 , 1998 ), Sri Lanka (1987 , 1989 , Tajikistan (1992), Turkey (1992), United
States (2001), and Zimbabwe (1976). 23 of these 32 wars had a clear ethnic dimension, while the wars in Sri Lanka (1989), Nepal (2002) , Colombia (1994 Colombia ( , 2001 Colombia ( , 2004 , Nicaragua (1978 Nicaragua ( , 1983 , and Peru (1983, 1988) were linked to communist and peasant insurgencies, (and perhaps to coca growing and paramilitary actions in Colombia).
However, some of the socioeconomic inequities and class tensions, which characterize Nepal and Latin America may also be rooted in ethnic differences (de Ferranti et al. 2004 , Telles and Steele 2012 , Lawoti and Hangen 2013 ).
14 The reason we need to impose both sample restrictions in the logit estimation is that, first, it is difficult to estimate interaction effects in discrete choice models and we do not know what the proper procedure would be for the conditional as opposed to regular logit model (Ai and Norton 2003 , Norton et al. 2004 ). Second conditional logit estimation requires the war onset measure to vary within each country during the sample period.
18
fact that we will be unable to test whether the terms of trade effect is significantly larger for countries with onset experience -since we cannot estimate the effect in the no-onset sample, we cannot compare the two estimates -seems less important than estimating the absolute vulnerability of countries with onset experience to terms of trade shocks. Importantly, the restriction to countries with onset experience rather than all the intermediately diverse countries will not mechanically increase the ˆ estimate in (1'). The reason is that, under the null hypothesis that the terms of trade effect is the same in all the countries, restricting the estimation to any subset, including the subset with onset experience, will not change the mean of ˆ.
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The results in Table 6 16 The two logit models for UCDP civil conflict onsets did not converge. All the insignificant terms of trade coefficients in Table 6 are borderline significant (in Columns (5)-(6), p=0.12, 0.14; in Column (8), p=0.17, 0.11). 17 Since the conditional logit model cannot actually predict marginal effects, we compute the "pseudo" marginal logit effects using the procedure explained in the Table 6 footnote. The average marginal effect for the UCDP and COW wars is 2 percentage points, but it increases to 3.8 once we include the Fearon and Laitin (2003) wars.
Comparison to Bazzi and Blattman (2014)
In contrast to our finding that commodity terms of trade declines cause civil war in countries with intermediate ethnic diversity or ethnic dominance, BB find no evidence linking commodity price declines to conflict in ethnically polarized countries. In this section, we show that the main reason for the different results is that we study the effects of terms of trade shocks rather than export price shocks. However, the facts that we focus on lagged rather than contemporary commodity price effects and allow the effects to vary with the ethnic diversity level and dominance status rather than polarization may also play a role.
BB's comprehensive civil war study covers 118 developing countries from 1958-2007.
The main methodology is to regress six different civil war onset dummies on the current, one and two year lagged growth rates of a country-specific commodity export price index. Additionally, they use a food and fuel price index to control for commodity price shocks to households.
Although the food and fuel price index is a global rather than country-specific variable, they interact the growth rate of the index with their 118 country dummies to allow for a countryspecific impact.
On the dependent variable side, BB's civil war onset measures mostly overlap with ours.
The average correlation between the shared onset dummies in the two studies is about 0.9. The Table 7 summarizes BB's overall findings for civil war onset by replicating their Table 2 , Panel B. The sums of the three export price effects are never significant. In our Table 7 , panel B we switch to (i) using the average growth rate of BB's export price index during the three preceding years and (ii) interacting this growth rate with BB's dummy for countries with greater ethnic polarization than the sample median country. Neither change alone, nor the simultaneous change we report in panel B, changes the lack of evidence that export price fluctuations cause civil war. If anything, export price declines appear to decrease the onset risk in polarized countries, which is almost the opposite of what we find. Panel C shows that using the overlapping sample across the two studies also yields no results. Panel D shows that replacing the average three-year growth rate of the export price index in BB's with the growth rate of the three-year moving average export price index in our data still does not change the non-result.
However, once we also replace BB's interactions between the global food and fuel price shock and the country dummies with the growth rate of our moving average import price index in Panel E, 23 of the 24 coefficients display the expected sign. Four of the twelve interactions with the high polarization dummy are now significant and two of the significant interactions are with the import rather than export price growth rate. All the price interaction effects also dominate the direct price effects, as we should expect. The average p-value for the sum of the four commodity price shocks (i.e., the p-value on whether commodity price shocks cause civil war in polarized countries) falls from 0.67 in Panel D to 0.35 in Panel E. Since we cannot reject that the effects of the export and import price shocks in the Panel E regressions are the same (plus the six pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables are at least 0.7, which raises a potential multicollinearity concern), Panel F replaces the separate export and import price index growth rates with the growth rate of the commodity terms of trade index. Now, the average p-value decreases to 0.20. Lastly, in panel G, we replace BB's above-median polarization dummy from Montalvo and Raynal-Querol (2005) with our intermediate ethnic diversity dummy from Fearon (2003) . The average p-value now decreases to 0.19 or 0.15 if we ignore BB's cumulative intensity-based definition of war onset in column (2), which may be debatable. 19 The magnitude and signs on the terms of trade and interaction terms resemble our estimates in Tables   3-5 .
Conclusion
This paper has documented a non-monotonic effect of commodity terms of trade shocks on the Note: Fixed effects estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and year fixed effects along with countryspecific time trends.  denotes the three-year moving average. Fixed effects estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and year fixed effects along with countryspecific time trends. p-value (sum of 6 terms=0) is the p-value on the null that the sum of the one, two and three year lagged annual terms of growth rates and their interactions with the ethnicity dummy is zero. Fearon and Laitin (2003) . Conflict are UCDP civil conflict as opposed to civil war onsets. p-value (sum of 6 terms=0) is the p-value on the null that the sum of the one, two and three year lagged annual terms of growth rates and their interactions with the ethnicity dummy is zero. Fixed effects estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and year fixed effects along with countryspecific time trends. The control variables are lagged five years. p-value (sum of 6 terms=0) is the p-value on the null that the sum of the one, two and three year lagged annual terms of growth rates and their interactions with the ethnicity dummy is zero. , where p is the mean predicted onset probability in the logit estimated samples (respectively, 0.035, 0.034, 0.028, 0.028, 0.053 and 0.053 Note: Fixed effects estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The six civil war onset measures in BB's dataset are dummies for, respectively, civil conflict onset in the UCDP dataset; a year where the cumulative UCDP death toll reaches 1000; a year where the annual death toll reaches 1000; civil war onset from an updated version of the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset; civil war onset from Sambanis (2004) ; and civil war onset from the Correlates of War Project. We refer to BB and the original data sources for further details. All regressions include country and year fixed effects along with country-specific time trends. Panel A replicates BB Table 2 Panel B. In our panel B, we (i) switch to using the lagged growth rate of the three-year moving average export price index in BB and (ii) interact this price growth measure with BB's dummy for countries with above-median ethnic polarization according to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) . Panel C only uses the overlapping sample across the two studies. Panel D replaces the growth rate of the moving average export price index based on BB's commodity price data with the corresponding growth rate in our dataset. Panel E replaces BB's interactions between a global food and fuel price index and the country dummies with the growth rate of our import price index. Panel F replaces our separate export and import price index growth rates with the growth of the commodity terms of trade index. Panel G replaces BB's polarization dummy based on Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) with our ethnic dominance dummy based on Fearon (2003) . 
Equation (a1) is the change in the CTOT index over a three-year period as percent of the initial moving average value. Equation (a2) is the change as percent of the initial value. Both expressions therefore summarize the average annual growth rate. Regressing (a1) on (a2) and its first and second lag -i.e., regressing the growth rate of the moving average on the three annual growth rates it summarizes -in our dataset also gives us an R-squared value of 0.98. Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.27 Note: Fixed effects estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in brackets.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The Anderson-Rubin p-value is the p-value for the null hypothesis that the growth coefficient is zero using the size-correct Anderson-Rubin test rather than the conventional Wald test, which may be biased by the presence of weak instruments (Finlay and Magnusson 2009) . The sample excludes Tajikistan, which has experienced some very extreme growth fluctuations.
